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Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth District 
Court for Utah County· 
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Aldrich, Bullock & Nelson · 
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1111 Deseret Bldg., 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton & 
Watkiss, 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT B. ~IECHA1I, et al. L UD-
LOW PLU~IBING SUPPLY CO., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 
5159 
PETITION OF APPELLANT, LUDLOW PLUMBING 
SUPPLY CO. FOR RE-HEARING 
The defendant and appellant Ludlow Plumbing 
Supply Co. respectfully requests a rehearing in the above 
entitled case upon the follo,ving grounds : 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Supreme Court erred in overruling its prior 
decision in the same case reported in 11 Utah 2d 159, 
356 p. 2d 281. 
2. The Supreme Court erred in holding that the 
lien and claim of Ludlo'v Plumbing Supply Co. was 
invalid and defective because the materials for which 
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claim was made were not furnished to imp-rove property 
owned by the same person or persons. 
3. The Supreme Court erred in holding that the 
lien and claim of Ludlow Plumbing Supply Co. 'vas 
invalid and defective because the materials for which 
claims were made were not apportioned to the properties 
upon which they were used. 
4. The Supreme Court erred in holding that Lud-
low Plumbing Supply Co.'s contention that D. Spencer 
Grow was the real party in interest and that Robert B. 
Mecham and his wife took title to the property in their 
names as agent for Grow is not substantiated by the 
record. 
5. The Supreme Court erred in holding that the 
appellant Ludlow Plumbing Supply Co. was not induced 
by the conduct of plaintiff to act differently than it 
would other,vise have acted in furnishing materials and 
supplies. 
6. The Supreme Court erred in affirming the judg-
ment of the trial court against the appellant Ludlow 
Plumbing Supply Company. 
7. The Supreme Court erred in refusing to return 
the action to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District in and for the State of Utah to hear and decide 
the issue of estoppel. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Counsel for appellant would supererogate to state 
fully the facts found in the· record, as they have been 
set out in previous briefs, argued to the court, and men-
tioned in two prior opinions. However, those which are 
necessary to support the present claims of error or the 
inferences counsel draw therefrom will be related under 
the particular point being argued. For purposes of 
simplicity and clarity Utah Savings & Loan Association 
will be referred to as respondent and Ludlow Plumbing 
Supply Company as appellant. 
POINT I. 
THE SUPREl\iE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING ITS 
PRIOR DECISION IN THE SAME CASE REPORTED IN 11 
UTAH 2d 159, 356 P. 2d 281. 
ARGUMENT 
This case has twice been argued before this Honor-
able Court and two diametrically opposite opinions have 
been published. When that situation arises, some of the 
points asserted and arguments made must necessarily 
be repetitious, but it is believed by the writers of this 
brief that the last decision of the Supreme Court is so 
contrary to the purposes of statutory liens, equitable 
principles and justice, that a partial repeating of argu-
ment should be acceptable as a means to cause the issue 
to be reconsidered and a further hearing granted. 
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In presenting our reasons for the contention ad-
vanced under this point, we first mention the merits of 
the first decision, for they are in keeping with the prin-
ciple that lien statutes should be construed reasonably 
and in such a way as not to defeat their obvious purposes. 
In that opinion it was recognized that the methods of 
operation of Robert B. 11echam, the owner and contrac-
tor, and the mortgagee, Utah Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation, were such that it was impossible for the lien 
claimants, including this appellant, to fix the value of 
materials which went into the various properties and 
that to do justice the application of the "equitable appor-
tionment" rule should be invoked. That was a salutory 
holding and the Court should not have been driven from 
the position. Unfortunately, however, the Court in the 
present opinion by tenuous reasoning does an about face 
and exculpates l\1echam and the respondent by the simple 
expedient of holding that appellant was at fault because 
its notice of lien covered too much property and named 
too many owners. In addition, in the first instance a 
unanimous court concluded that the trial judge failed to 
make necessary findings on the issue of estoppel, par-
ticularly, the knowledge or lack of knowledge by the 
respondent that the money "\Vas being borrowed for the 
purpose of crfating i1nprovements on the property and 
that materials "rere being furnished under circumstances 
that respondent reasonably should lmow that material-
men were relying upon being paid from such funds. 
Now that issue is summarily dismissed and counsel for 
the appellant fails to understand why a question as im-
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portant as that is now glossed over by the Court to the 
benefit of a mortgagee who aided and abetted in co-
mingling and misapplying materials and moneys to the 
detriment of innocent materialmen and to the enrich-
ment of itself. Certainly a decision which brings about 
that inequitable result spa,vns the thought that sharp 
practices pay large dividends. It is the hope of counsel 
for appellant in this brief to convince the Court to retreat 
to its original position of equity and justice and change 
the result to the end that those who deal unfairly will 
not carry away the prize. 
We believe it essential to a proper consideration of 
this first point to consider the cast of characters and the 
efforts of the leading men to exploit and saddle losses 
on other members of the troupe. When this is done the 
respective merits of the two opinions in this case may 
be weighed. The lead character by any criteria was D. 
Spencer Grow; he held ninety per cent of the stock of 
the plaintiff corporation and was the puppet master who 
pulled the financial strings for the disbursement, alloca-
tion and payment of all moneys on all properties withollt 
regard to ownership. It mattered not to him \vho owned 
the land where the improvements were made or which 
piece of property should be charged with the advance 
as he allocated the money wherever he thought would' 
best serve his interests. Any similarity between his 
method of operation and that of an ordinary loan official 
dealing with independent borrowers is not found in this 
record. Moreover, he· well knew that funds earmarked 
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for a particular loan were being misapplied and he above 
all could have prevented that sort of misapplication and 
the losses suffered by mechanics and materialmen. 
Furthermore, he knew that materials furnished by this 
appellant and other materialmen were being used indis-
criminately on all properties. The second most important 
character in this drama is Robert B. Mecham. While he 
may have initiated the program in good faith, he learned 
early in the venture that he was being used by Grow as 
a device for constructing homes at less than their cost 
and that a continuation of the construction would result 
in losses to the suppliers and benefits to Grow and his 
companies. In addition to being a tool for Grow, he was 
primarily responsible for the garbled use of materials. 
In this particular appeal the appellant was first con-
sidere·d by the ·Court as the innocent character who had 
figuratively lost its shirt to the above-mentioned villains 
- and then in a short space of time appellant became 
the culprit and the rascals \vere whitewashed. If the 
characterizations set out above are supported by the 
record, and counsel for appellant insists they are, then 
the tragedy of this litigation is apparent and the scales 
are out of balance because the Court was induced to leave 
a position of strength and justice· for one of weakness 
and injustice. Accordingly, appellant respectfully insists 
the Court erred in overruling its prior decision. 
POINT II. 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THA'T 
THE LIEN AND CLAIM OF LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY 
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CO. WAS INVALID AND DEFECTIVE BECAUSE THE MA-
TERIALS FOR WHICH CLAIM WAS MADE WERE NOT 
FURNISHED TO IMPROVE PROPERTY OWNED BY THE 
SAME PERSON OR PERSONS. 
ARGUl\!ENT 
In arguing this point counsel believe it significant 
to point out that the Court did not find that the· appel-
lant's materials were not used to improve all of the 
properties here involved. Neither did the Court find 
that all owners and plaintiff were not benefited by the 
materials furnished. Accordingly, the only basis to sup-
port the Court's conclusion is the vague notion that the 
notice should be held to be fatally defective because more 
than one person held title to the lands covered by the 
notice of intent to hold lien and the materials used on 
each particular piece of property were not identified. 
At this point and touching only on the ownership facet 
of the argument, it might be helpful to state what the 
record shows with regard to ownership and control of 
properties where the appellant's materials were used. 
There are seven individuals and corporations who appear 
as record holders of the lands, and they are all mentioned 
in the notice of lien. They are: Robert B. Mecham and 
"~ife; Mid-Utah Construction Company; Radio Sales 
Corporation; Grow Investment & Mortgage Company; 
:nlortgage Insurance Corporation; and Thfid-Utah Broad-
casting Company. The record shows that including the 
:Jiechams ·every purported owner involved in all the 
construction projects was controlled and manipulated by 
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Grow to suit his personal purposes, and that plaintiff 
Utah Savings & Loan Association belonged in that cate-
gory and was used in this construction program to aid 
and benefit Grow. Accordingly, we· have a situation 
where all dealings by purported owners of all properties 
were funneled into a channel which was managed, oper-
ated and maneuvered by the same person who controlled 
the purse strings. When faced with that situation, some 
of the technical principles of law on liens are inappliC-
able, and they are replaced by equitable· hypotheses. 
Be the foregoing as it may, for the purposes of this 
point alone we will assume that the corporations owning 
the properties were separate and distinct entities, but 
·even with that assumption we are unable to ascertain 
how they, along with Grow and Mecham, have been pre-
judiced by the inclusion of their names and properties 
in one document, and why it is invalid against them. 
Primarily the filing of notice of lien is to give notice to 
the owner, other lien claimants and all persons dealing 
with, or claiming an interest in, the property that the 
lienor is seeking to hold the property for the amount due 
him for the merchandise he supplied to benefit and im-
prove the premises. C·ertainly, not one can contend 
seriously that the lien filed in this case by appellant 
failed to serve that purpose. If in truth and in fact 
prope-rties are owned by two different individuals, then 
the premises of owner ''A" should not be saddled with 
the cost of the improvements placed on the premises of 
owner "B"; that, however, is not the situation here and 
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has nothing to do with the question of notice. If both 
individuals are named in the notice of lien, then each 
has notice that the lienor is asserting some- claim against 
his property; and if later there should be any question 
arise in connection with the reasonable value of materials 
used on the property of each owner, a Court could deter-
mine the proper charge against the property under the 
doctrine of equitable apportionment. The whole concept 
underlying the purposes of the lien statute is. to prevent 
an owner of land from obtaining the labor and capital 
of anothe-r person and retain the benefits thereof with-
out paying therefor. Surely that wholesome principle 
should not be discarded becauBe of a claim, technical at 
best, that the names of more than one separate· owners 
were included in the same document. 
Going one step further, the Court's present opinion 
seems to hold that the lien is invalid per se because of 
the sweeping coverage and that even if this was a suit 
involving only the appellant and Mecham, that the latter 
\Vould succeed. Apparently the ·Court overlooked the 
facts that in certain instance he was both owner and 
contractor and that the reasons for requiring strict com-
pliance with the statutes are not present. It may well 
be that the lienor's rights must be cut off when third 
parties are involved, but even then an inequitable situa-
tion would be brought about by a holding that merely 
because different persons are named in a lien the secu-
rity is lost and the owner gets enriched. The rationaliza-
tion used by the Court in reaching that result in the case 
at bar is entirely contrary to the philosophy supporting 
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statutory liens, and particularly is that true when there 
is not a shred of evidence that Mecham was misled be-
cause he was joined with an owner of another parcel of 
land. Regardless of the broad coverage of the lien filed 
by the appellant, it was docketed in good faith, it gave 
more than ample notice to all interested parties, and it 
covered property improved and benefited by appel-
lant's property; and yet the full effect of the Court's 
latest ruling is that the owners or their privy are per-
mitted to retain the property without being required to 
pay therefor. 
To make this point perfectly clear, we are not argu-
Ing the priority of appellant's lien and respondent's 
mortgage, as we will treat with that later. What we are 
seeking to impress upon the Court is that under the 
present decision the lien is held to be invalid even as 
against Mecham, the purported owner and prime con-
tractor, merely because it names others than himself. 
He is not protesting the validity of the lien, and it 'vould 
appear to us that respondent is in no position to raise 
the issue unless its mortgage is subsequent in point of 
time and inferior to appellant's lien. Certainly it has 
no standing or reason to complain of the infirmities in 
the lien if it does not impinge on the rights fixed by the 
Inortgage. 
For the foregoing reasons it appears to appellant's 
counsel that if the decision of the Court holding respon-
dent's mortgage to be superior to appellant's lien is 
proper, the additional holding that the lien is invalid is 
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not only a mere gratuity but a gift which conceivably 
could prejudice this appellant. 
The generalizations set out above are supported by 
the Utah law and prior pronouncements by this Court. 
Ho,vever, before discussing the specifics, we believe it 
advisable to mention the rule generally followed by the 
more forward thinking Judges in construing lien statutes. 
It is stated in 57 C.J.S. p. 500, Mechanics' Liens, para-
graph 4 b. ( 2) as follows : 
(2) Liberal Construction 
In most states the mechanics' lien statutes 
are regarded as remedial in their nature, and 
therefore must be liberally construed, subject to 
the limitation that the construction must be 
reasonable. 
In most states mechanics' lien statutes are 
regarded as remedial in their nature, and there-
fore generally should be liberally construed so 
as to effectuate their objects and purp·os~es and 
protect laborers, materialmen, or other claim-
ants within the scope of the statutes, as well as to 
promote substantial justice and equity as to all 
parties concerned. This rule has been said to be 
the better doctrine and to represent the trend of 
more recent decisions. 
With the foregoing rule In mind, we look to the 
Utah statutes; Title 38, Chapter 1, § 7, insofar as rele-
vant, it reads : 
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• • • must file for record with the county 
recorder of the country in which the property, 
or some part thereof, is situated a claim in writ-
ing, containing a notice of intention to hold and 
claim a lien, and a statement of his demand after 
deducting all just credit sand offs,ets, with the 
name of the owner, .if known, • • • 
The Court in the last opinion quotes this section 
but apparently elects to construe it as standing alone 
and not in pari materia with other sections, for the quo-
tation set out above is followed in the decision by this 
statement: 
"This section would appear to apply only 
to a claim for work or material furnished on a 
single building, structure or improvement." 
We submit that if this quoted section is construed with 
other pertinent sections on Mechanics' Liens that logical-
ly it must follow that if there were many buildings in 
which supplies and materials were used and the name of 
the owner was unknown, a lien including a statement 
to that effect would be valid. If validity can be breathed 
into a lien with the owner undesignated', then surely a 
lien which mentions more than one owner ought to be 
more effective, for at least the named owners are placed 
on notice that their property is being held for a claim 
asserted by the lienor. 
Now as to the specific. In United States Building 
& Loan Ass'n vs. Midvale Home Finance Corporation, 
86 U. 506, 44 P. 2d 1090, it appears that there was more 
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than one owner of the· p·roperty and so far as the record 
appears only one owner was named in the notice of the 
lien. Moreover, there was no attempt to designate the 
amount claimed to be due the lienors on each piece of 
property. Thus there was a deviation from the exact 
statutory prescription, but in that case the court did not 
hold the variations invalid'ated the lien. A somewhat 
similar question was involved in the earlier case of 
Eccles Lumber Co. vs. Martin, 31 Ut 241, 87 P.713, and 
the Supre·me Court came up with the same answer. Both 
of those holdings indicate the Court was not concerned 
with deficiencies which did not mislead other parties to 
their detriment. Counsel for respondent differentiates 
these cases by merely stating that they are not authority 
contrary to the· position they assert. We disagree and 
assert that through misapprehension of the consequences 
of the first decision the Court has wandered far afield 
from equity and justice. We believe it should return ere 
it is too late. 
In furtherance of this point, 've submit the following; 
The Court recognized that the notice of lien named only 
~Iecham's and Grow-controlled corporations. In every 
instance herein involved the contract to construct the 
homes was negotiated betwe,en Grow and Mecham. The 
corporations were owned, controlled and managed by 
Grow and used by him as a shield to protect his construc-
tion manipulations. l\Ioreover, the record shows per-
suasively that all plaintiff's advances for construction 
loans were for purposes of eventually building up the 
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worth of Grow. It was impossible for any ordinary 
materialman to know who was the real party in interest, 
and from the method of operation and control, it was 
improbable that anyone could ascertain whether Mecham 
was the owner or merely an alter ego for Grow and his 
corporate shields. If more o'vners were named than was 
necessary and if materials were not allocated to buildings 
where used by lot and block, it was because of overlap-
ping and surreptitious activities by Mecham, Grow and 
respondent. The lien statutes are intended to make it 
possible for ordinary citizens to prepare notices suf-
ficient to protect themselves and basic ingredients only 
must be set out; but if notices of liens are to be declared 
invalid because of technical niceties in de~criptions, 
identifications, and misjoinder of parties, then not only 
will laymen be. unable to meet prescribed standards, but 
la,vyers 'viii be required to draw lines so carefully that 
the slightest deviation will render the notice of no force 
and effect. It is hoped by counsel for appellant that that 
result not he forced upon the public and they are con-
vinced that a reversal of the present holding is necessary 
to restore simplicity to the preparation of the documents. 
POINT III. 
'THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE LIEN AND CLAIM OF LUDLOW PLUMBING COMPANY 
WAS INVALID AND DEFECTIVE BECAUSE MATERIALS 
FOR WHICH CLAIMS WERE MADE WERE NOT APPOR-
TIONED TO THE PROPERTIES UPON WHICH THEY 
WERE USED. 
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ARGl1MENT 
·Counsel for appellant present this point out of an 
abundance of caution as they have a feeling that the 
members of the Court who changed their 1ninds between 
the t'vo decisions did so because of belief that they might 
wreak havoc on the title standards now being followed 
in the State of Utah. Counsel believe that these fears 
are unfounded, for facts control principles of law and 
equity and when, as here, the Court is faced with a 
peculiar factual base which shows comingling of funds, 
shifting of materials and uncertainties in connection with 
the place of use, a liberal construction of the statute in 
favor of an innocent party could not affect the standards 
adversely. l\Ioreover, consideration should be given to 
the possibility that greater harm may result to the stan-
dards if the rules laid down in Eccles Lumber Co. vs. 
l\fartin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713, and United States Build-
ing & Loan Association vs. Midvale Home Finance Cor-
poration, 86 Utah 506, 44 P. 2d 1090, are clouded. 
Obviously the members of the Court joining in the 
majority opinion must believe that those cases can be 
distinguished from the one at Bar. Counsel appreciate 
that distinctions of varying degrees can be pointed out 
when the holdings in different cases are being compared, 
but in the case at Ba.r, the majority opinion appears to 
rely on a very weak reed for this is the distinguishing 
feature: 
"As previously pointed out, Ludlow's notice 
of a lien included properties owned by the Grow-
controlled corporations in addition to the proper-
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ties o'vned by the Mecham's. Therefore its clailn 
is defective and invalid because the materials for 
which claim was made were not ·furnished upon 
buildings owned by the same person or persons.'' 
While it is recognized that this quotation goes 
around the periphery of this issue, it seems that by 
implication the Court is touching on the failure of appel-
lant to fix the amount of materials used to improve each 
piece of property. As previously mentioned, if the 
factual situation was different the rule announced in the 
quotation might be appropos, but here when you push 
aside the window dressing you see the familiar face of 
Grow in every building and the rule concerning failure 
to designate the materials used on each piece of property 
is governed by the above cited cases and therefore re·-
quires reversal of the present holding. 
POINT IV 
THE SUPREME COUR'T ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY COMPANY'S CONTENTION 
THAT D. SPENCER GROW WAS THE REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST AND THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM AND HIS 
WIFE TOOK TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN THEIR NAMES 
AS AGENT FOR GROW IS NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY THE 
RECORD. 
ARGUMENT 
Because the Court merely notes that the issue is not 
substantiated by the record, counsel for appellant is 
unable to ascertain the particular deficiency. However, 
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we do assert that the Record shows the following and 
that it is more than ample to sustain the assigned error~ 
The record titles to the various propertie·s in these 
areas were vested in either Mecham, or Grow's com-
panies; that the real party in intere.st, that is, the com-
pany which was seeking to break into the construction 
loan business was at all times the respondent who acted 
through its p-rincipal stockholder, Grow; that at his dir-
ection, it furnished all monies, not only for the construc-
tion of the houses on the prop.erty, but also for the pur-
chase price· of the property; that 11echam had little, if 
any, equity in any of the properties; that respondent 
furnished more money on the Keyridge property than the 
total cost of the real estate and the contract price for the 
buildings; that it financed the construction on the 
Schauerhamer property and it furnished all monies to ac-
quire the Rowley and LaMesa prop·erties; that when 
l\ieeham and Grow concluded that the Rowley and La-
Mesa areas should be improved ~fecham was so heavily 
in debt that he \Vas unable to complete the construction 
of the houses which he had agreed to build in the Key-
ridge area and the Schauer hamer area; that it was ne·ces--
sary to obtain more land to raise moneys through re-
spondent's mortgages in order to complete the houses for 
Grow or his companies in th~ Keyridge and Schauer-
harner areas; that l\tfecham had no money when he nego-
tiated with Rowleys for the acquisition of the LaMesa 
property and that he made the payment called for by the 
contract out of monies advanced by the respondent on the 
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other properties which misapplication was concurred in 
by Grow; that he was instructed by Grow to do the nego-
tiating for the property and to take title or to enter into a 
contract for the purchase of the property in his, 
Mecham's, name and that respondent would furnish the 
money to make payment; that Grow was at all times the 
President of respondent Company and the controlling 
stockholder; that he was President or an officer and 
controlling stockholder in all of the companies which 
held title to the various properties; that he controlled, 
directed, supervised and managed the building and finan-
cial activities of ~1echam, and if the latter had any voice 
in the ultimate decision it was so weak it could not be 
heard; that Grow sat on the loan committee and approved 
loans to each of theS'e companies and in legal effect he 
was dealing with himself; that 95% of the construction 
loans made by respondent were to Grow companies; 
that as between ~iecham, Grow and the companies there 
were no arms length dealings; that respondent advanced 
$30,000.00 out of mortgages placed on the LaMesa 
property before any work was started in that area; that 
at the direction of Grow and through the operations 
of respondent company, money was paid to complete 
houses and property owned' by Grow; and that so far 
as this record shows Mecham 'vas merely a tool which 
Grow used for his benefit and through 'vhom he 
successfully enriched himself at Appellant's expense. 
If, in law, that set of facts does not show a principal 
who controlled the thinking, acting and ordering and an 
agent 'vho Inerely follo,ved directions and orders, then 
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couns'el fails to understand how a status can be created 
which is that of principal and agent. 
POINT V. 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE APPELANT LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY COMPANY 
WAS NOT INDUCED BY THE CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF TO 
AGT DIFFERENTLY THAN IT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE 
ACTED IN FURNISHING MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES. 
ARGUMENT 
This point is without a doubt the most important to 
the success or failure of appellant and the Court in its 
latest decision committed its most egregious error when 
it gave short shrift to its disposition and then dispoS'ed 
of it wrongly. The Trial Judge did worse, for he failed 
to give any consideration to the issue· and made no 
finding of fact thereon even though importuned to do 
so by counsel for appellant. For the latter reason alone 
it would appear to follow that the present decision must 
be reversed, for under the law, as we interpret it, when 
findings are insufficient the Supreme Court remands 
the case to the Trial Judge to make appropriate findings 
of fact on all material and relevant issues. See Utah 
Association of Credit Men vs. Home Fire Insurance Co., 
36 Utah 20, 102 P. 631. 
In the latest opinion in this instance the Supreme 
Court cites 57 C.J.S. p. 768 and recognizes the~ rule 
therein laid down. It states good law and we quote the 
pertinent parts : 
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"A mortgagee may be precluded by estoppel 
or the like from claiming priority over the holder 
of mechanics' or materialmen's liens and, where 
a mortgagee has failed to.take the necessary steps 
prescribed by statute to obtain priority for him-
self over mechanics' liens, equity will not dis-
regard the terms of the statutes to avoid the 
consequences of the mortgagee's own careless-
ness. A mortgagee may by reason of his having 
induced the furnishing of labor or materials be 
precluded from asserting the priority of a mort-
gage over a mechanic's lien.,., 
''Of course the facts in particular cases may 
not be such as to estop or preclude the mortgagee 
from asserting priority. In order to establish 
an estoppel against the mortgagee a lienholder 
must show some concealment, misrepresentation, 
act or declaration on which the lienholder proper-
ly relied and by which he was induced to act 
differently than he would otherwise have acted." 
The limited reason mentioned by the majority mem-
bers of the ·Court to dispose of this issue of estoppel 
is that a reading of the record and the Findings of Fact 
revealed to them that the defending lien claimants were 
not induced by the plaintiff to act differently than they 
would otherwise have acted. Counsel for appellant, like 
the dissenting members of the Court, take sharp issue 
with that conclusion for it ignores hu1nan conduct and 
behavior. Obviously, we can speak only for this lienor; 
but as to hiln there are many reasons why the majority 
of the Court overlooked the obvious and we herein-
after mention a few. 
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First, the record indicates clearly that Mecham was 
insolvent and in debt to the ~extent of some $150,000.00. 
Common sense would suggest that a materialman would 
not furnish materials to a debtor that he knew was un-
able to pay. Respondent knew 1\fecham's financial con-
dition but for reasons best known to it, no disclosure 
was made to appellant. This concealment induced appel-
lant to continue extending credit. 
Second, ordinary banking practice by a reputable 
institution leads materialm·en to believe that money would 
cease to be advanced if a builder was bankrupt. Signifi-
cantly, respondent continued to furnish funds to Mecham 
during a substantial period of time, knowing he \vas 
unable to pay his bills. Had respondent not played along 
with ~fecham, appellant would have stopped the flow of 
supplies. 
Third, this appellant would not have furnished 
materials to ne\v properties had it known that money 
to be realized from mortgages placed on that land was 
to be diverted to and used for the payn1ent of improve-
ments on other properties belonging to the principal 
stockholder of the lender. Again, had respondent, who 
was participating in this practice, notified appellant 
of the true situation, the later supplies would not have 
been shipped. 
Fourth, respondent knew l\[echam \Vas losing money 
on his construction and it not only remained silent about 
that condition, but it \vent further and led third parties 
to believe he was prospering. It is axiomatic that 
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materialmen do not ordinarily furnish supplies to losing 
ventures without requiring some security. 
Fifth, this appellant would not have continued to 
furnish materials had it been informed that padded 
notes secured by the ostensible owner, were obtained 
by the mortgagee 'vho just happens to be the respondent 
and winner of the last round. 
Sixth, no sane merchant would extend credit to a 
debtor whose principal source of income was funds re-
alized from mortgages when those funds were heing mis-
applied and paid to a selective few, particularly, in-
dividuals or companies allied in the venture and the 
principal stockholder of the mortgagee. 
We could advance other reasons to further under-
nline the conclusion reached by a majority of the Court, 
but we believe the foregoing are sufficient to show 
that resp,ondent's concealment and action were intended 
to and did mislead this appellant to do something he 
otherwise would not have done, namely to furnish mater-
ials to the subsequent projects. Accordingly, we believe 
the conclusion reached by a majority of the Court is 
based on the quicksand of a mistaken belief that there 
'vas no inducement. 
Apparently other matters of some importance were 
overlooked by the n1ajority of the Court. This record 
does not show a single and isolated transaction between 
Mechan1 and appellant. On the contrary, it discloses 
d\ealings continuous in nature taking place over a sub-
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stantial period of time. Appellant furnished materials 
and supplies on an open account basis and they were 
delivered from the 6th day of June 1956 to the 19th 
day of June 1957. Obviously at any time during that 
period had the appellant been informed of the method 
of operation and irregular payments by respondent at 
the direction and for the benefit of its principal stock-
holder the stream of supplies could have been stopped 
and appellant's losses prevented. However, due to re-
spondent's activities, together with those of its control-
ling stockholder, Grow, app·ellant 'vas led to believe 
that all was in financial order and that moneys avail-
able to be paid out for the construction would be chan-
neled in proper sources. Now it is met with the mere 
assertion by the Court that respondent's conduct did 
not induce it to act differently than it would otherwise 
have acted. That declaration is plainly contrary to 
ordinary business practices and procedures. 
Having argued that appellant was induced to its 
detriment because of respondent's conduct, we now con-
sider the method by which we saddle respondent with 
misleading the appellant. Estoppel is an equitable rem-
edy and it is applied to a situation where, because of 
something which he has done or omitted to do, a party 
is denied the right to plead or prove an otherwise im-
portant fact. The doctrine must be rooted in the facts 
and circumstances of a particular case. And so we 
look to this record to ascertain whether the respondent, 
because it acted by, through and at the direction of 
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Grow, should be denied the right to plead and prove 
that appellant's lien is invalid. Grow was the principal 
stockholder and the agent of respondent in all of these 
transactions, and his knowledge is imputable to the 
respondent. He knew that during the construction of 
the first homes in the Key Ridge area that Mecham was 
losing money; he was well aware of the fact that material-
men were furnishing materials to improve the property, 
and he took no action to notify them of l\lecham's bank-
rupt financial condition; but on the contrary, he worked 
with Mecham to obtain additional properties on which 
to construct homes in the hope that the amounts due 
on the Key Ridge property could be paid, thereby giving 
the impression that l\{echam was solvent. He had the 
respondent advance the money for the purchase of the 
property and had it divert funds which should have been 
used on the subsequent developments to those properties 
which were encumbered earlier. The whole thrust of 
the plan was to benefit and protect properties owned 
either by Grow or his controlled corporations, and the 
diversions resulted in a shortage of payments on the 
properties subsequently developed. 'Vithout going fur-
ther into detail, if kno,vledge of the facts 1nentioned only 
in this paragraph is chargeable to the respondent, most 
certainly it should be estopped. IIo"·ever, the con1plete 
knowledge by Gro,v, as pointed -out in other sections of 
the brief, is imputable to respondent and the whole 
bundle of facts, when considered in the proper perspec-
tive, compel a holding that respondent should not be 
heard to eomplain of the deficiencies in the notice of 
the lien, if there are deficiencies. 
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One other question touching on this point needs 
clarification: it is to be noted that appellant is claim-
ing that respondent is estopped from asserting the in-
validity of the lien and also from asserting that its 
mortgage is superior to appellant's lien. We have set 
forth the reasons for estoppel on the first ground, and 
so we move on to discuss why respondent should be 
estopped from making the later assertion. In that con-
nection we believe that without question the evidence 
shows a unitary plan or scheme to promote a building 
venture \vhich included construction in several noncon-
tiguous areas. The s-cheme and device of 1\fecham, aided 
and abetted by Grow and' respondent, was that materials 
should be furnished to a given location; from here they 
were distributed to the several projects and no attempt 
was made to keep a record of the particular area where 
used, and appellant was informed it made no difference. 
The appellant had one contract, and the original materials 
were furnished on the 6th day of June 1956; that is the 
time the appellant's lien took effect, and any mortgages 
recorded thereafter are subsequent to that lien. But 
assuming the worst situation against appellant, and 
that is, that each building project 'vas a separate and 
distinct transaction, then as previously pointed out 
the acts and conduct of respondent and Grow misled 
this appellant into believing that it was dealing with 
one contractor, financed by one lending company, and 
building under one construction plan. Accordingly, if re-
spondent is not estopped from contending each home was 
a separate and independent transaction and can escape 
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liability on the basis that its mortgage is prior to appel-
lant's lien, then it is granted a largess because of its own 
misconduct. We do not believe principles of law when 
correctly applied bring about this result, and we acccord-
ingly contend this point should be sustained in appellant's 
favor. 
POINTS v"'I - VII. 
Counsel for appellant believe the arguments set 
out previously adequately present their views on these 
points. However, in connection with Point VII, we call 
the Court's attention to its prior decisions in which it 
has held that the trial court's failure to find on all 
material issues is error and that the trial judge must 
find the facts upon every issue, either affirmatively 
or negatively. See Piper vs. Eakle, 78 Utah 342, 2 P.2d 
909; and Thomas vs. Clayton Piano Co., 47 Utah 91, 
151 P. 143. In this case the trial judge failed to follow 
those authorities and because of his preferred position 
to detennine the credibility of 'vitnesses and the issue of 
estoppel, this Court should return the case to him for 
further proceedings. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
George ''r· Latimer, and 
Backman, Baclnnan & Clark, 
Attorneys for appellant 
Ludlow Plumbing Supply Co. 
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